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ABSTRACT 
The directions that fuRxre malnned navigation, guidance and control developments 
a r e  likely to take a r e  explored. The scope of these future developments i s  shown to be 
encompassed by the types of space transportation systems to be used and the objectives 
of the exploration bases  to be developed. The requirements for  an ear th orbital explo- 
ration base and i t s  supporting logistics shuttle a r e  considered in  the context of our  past 
experience and the unique requirements of the f u h r e .  It  is shown that we will be tran- 
sitioning f rom programs that a r e  pr incipdly developmental in nature, to  programs 
which a r e  more  operationally conditioned. This fact, coupled with the resulting longer 
duration missions, indicates a need for  a reconsideration of our manned navigation, 
guidance and control system approaches. The mechanization challenge for  the fuLure 
will not be in meeting discrete performance requirements. Pt wi l l  resul t  f rom the 
need to meet stringent reliability goals that will, more than ever before, be intimately 
associated with program costs.  
As the Apollo Program approaches i t s  culmination and the character is t ics  of 
NASA's advanced manned mission become more  definitive, i t  is timely to  consider the 
directions to be taken in the development of midance and control sys tems for  these 
future programs. The directions that these developments take will be determined by 
three factors.  The first i s  the logical top-to-bottom consideration whereby the mission, 
system, and subsystem requirements a r e  defined more o r  l e s s  sequentially. The sec- 
ond is the technological state of the a r t  a t  the t ime these developments a r e  undertaken, 
fo r  i t  defines what is possible. The third factor might be considered a f i l ter  through 
which the f i r s t  two must pass  to get the needed results.  I t  represents  the application 
of our  background and experience in  previous manned widance and control develop- 
ments  to these new programs. In essence, our future r e ~ i r e m e n t s  will be met with 
a logical and evolutionary approach founded on the integral sum of knowledge from our 
previous manned programs, That is raot to say that we will  necessarily u s e  &he same 
l echn iqes  or the  same hardware  as we largely have, for example, in our Applications 
Program, That program is designed do amortize our rather substantial ApoIEo hard- 
ware investment wi th  an expanded programmatic scope. The techniques may change 
and the har&aase will. undcubtedly be different but OVP I I ~ F X P  deve~opments  hii ill: without 
question, be conditioned by what we have learned in the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
Progr-ams. 
The purpose of this  paper is thus to explore, with some generalities and some 
specifics, the first and third of these three factors  i n  an attempt to define what the 
probable directions for  our future manned guidance and control developments will be. 
The second factor, the technological s ta te  of the a r t ,  will only be touched on as nec- 
essary  to amplify the other considerations. After briefly discussing the likely future 
manned missions, consideration is given to some of their specific and implied naviga- 
tion, guidance and control requirements. Then, using the resul ts  of our other manned 
programs, particularly Apollo, the implementation of some of these new requirements 
is discussed in  the light of our past  solutions. 
FUTURE MANNED MI SS IONS 
As of this date the actual manned space flight program to be undertaken in  the 
future has  not been identified in  detail. Ekact launch dates, specific flight objectives, 
ra tes  at which launches a r e  to occur, etc. ,  a r e  not defined. However, the potential 
elements of the manned space flight program and their anticipated phasing a r e  known 
and a r e  shown in figure 1. Note that this figure merely shows flight blocks approxi- 
mately oriented in time. The Apollo Program's  objective of landing a man on the 
CALENDAR YEARS 
Figure I ,  Manned Space n igh t  Program 
moon and reh;varr,ing him should be completed i n  the calendar year 1969 to 3 970 t i m e  
period. Next will fallow the Lunar F~pXoratiohx Pr-og~-am (LEP), wI~ieR ~ r a .  i t s  early 
phase will corrsishof several f l i g l~ t s  to llae varlo~as primary ApolEo landing sites, These 
flights will s t r ive for  the utrnost tira"kthe Apollo Spacecraft, with little or  pea change, 
can provide in  the achievement of the Apollo Lunar S~jrface Experiment Package 
(AESEP) scientific objectives and in lunar exploratbor~ potential. As currently planned, 
the five-flight Apollo Applications Program (AAP) will fly in the calendar yeas 199% to 
1972 time period. Whether A A P  wi l l  fly concurrently with the LEP, a s  shown, has  not 
been determined. The la t ter  portion of the LEP will be  flown in the I971 to f 992 calen- 
dar year  t ime period. I t  should be noted that the balance b e h e e n  the number of flights 
in  this phase and in the first one is yet to be determined. Operations in  the l a t e r  phase 
a r e  to be conducted with improvements to the Apollo hardware which will allow landings 
at more  challenging lunar locations with more landed payload and extended stay times. 
These missions could involve dual landings with the additional landing being accom- 
plished by either a manned o r  an unmmned vehicle; and potentially, they a r e  to include 
the operational u se  of lunar flying units and lunar rover vehicles. 
The next three blocks of flights represent the operational periods of ear th orbit, 
lunar, and planetary exploration bases.  Only the ear th orbital exploration base is 
oriented in  time, for  it is beginning to evolve as a definitive concept which could begin 
flight operations in  the 19'75 to 19'76 t ime period. This ear th  orbital base, which could 
weigh of the order  of a million pounds, is being conceived as a t rue  orbital facility. 
Initial segments of the base used in early operations will have a minimum lifetime of 
2 years,  but the base itself will have as a goal a %@-year  life. I t  includes periodic 
personnel changes and resupply flights with a shuttle vehicle on a 90- to 180-day cycle. 
I t  should be pointed out here  that the goal of a very long exploration base lifetime and a 
sustained ra te  of logistic shuttle flights will make it extremely important to minimize 
this program's  operational costs.  In the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo Programs,  
which were principally developmental, the nonrecurring and recurr ing costs were  of 
the same order  of magnitude. This earth exploration base and its objectives will be  
the principal focus on which this paper centers.  The lunar exploration base and the 
planetary exploration base a r e  also both viaMe program possibilities. Were A p ~ l l o  
to discover resources which would minimize the logistics problem, the lunar base 
could move timewise into contention with the orbital exploration base. A s  far as the 
more  distant future is concerned, we believe that ultimately the manned space flight 
program will encompass the exploration of some of the planets in our  solar  system. 
The principal characteristic that these missions will have, aside from the rather  size- 
able departure mass  in earth orbit, i s  a very long duration and some rather  formidable 
abort  limitations once ear th escape speed bas been achieved. In line w i a  our evolu- 
tionary concept of guidance and control developments, we believe that the capabilities 
and codidence needed for  such missions must be developed and demonstrated in the 
ear th orbital and lunar exploration programs. 
NAVIGATION G U I  DANCE AND CONTROL REQU I REMENTS 
Considering these NASA missions in general and in the light 06 the obvious navi- 
gation, guidance, and control functions to be pesforaned, we can deliale two general 
types of requirements, These are the rniasioa~ flight-path cslltroE requiremen& and 
the mission-objec3tive reyurrementr.  TXlr rnissiolr flight-11ath ~1:onlcol requirements are 
those requirements associated -with transparta,tion systems, that is, systems which 
are designed to deliver men and mater id  lo  pal-titular locations in support of specific 
objectives. It is obvious that  the most deera~tnding missions from a ilight-path control 
point of view are the high-energy lunar and planetary missions. The lower energy 
earth-orbstal missions, such as AAP, tend to have less critical flight-path control 
recy_uiremer~"c. Apollo has demonstrated the naveation, g~ idance  and control capability 
necessary to fly the high-energy flight paths. This performance capability, though not 
the system lifetime, has also been shown adequate fo r  a manned planetary mission to 
Mars. 3 
The mission-objective requirements specify those capabilities needed to accom- 
plish the objectives of the exploration bases. They can be demanding, o r  not, depend- 
ing on the base's objectives. Apollo, for example, has few such requirements, for 
the Program's goal is to accomplish a manned lunar landing and return. This is i n  
essence a transportation system flight-path control requirement. Some minor mission- 
objective requirements, such as inflight landing si te  photography, a r e  included in the 
program but a r e  structured such a s  to augment rather than interfere with the primary 
goal. The AAP and the earth orbital base, on the other hand, a r e  heavily mission- 
objective oriented, and thus some of the most demanding navigation and control re- 
quirements resulted from this factor. The scope of our future navigation, guidance 
and control requirements, then, i s  encompassed by the types of transportation systems 
to be used and the objectives of the exploration bases to be developed. 
Transportation Systems 
The types of manned and unmanned primary and logistic/support transportation 
systems needed for various types of bases a r e  shown in Table I. The principal ele- 
ments of the AAP, which is in reality a small exploration base, a r e  delivered to orbit 
TABLE I 
BASES FOR MANNED SPACE EXPLORATION 
TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEMS 
Manned 
PRIMARY 
1 Unmanned 
Manned 
LOGISTICS 
SUPPORT 
Unmanned 
EARTH ORBITAL I LUNAR I PLANETARY 
EARTH I EXPL BASE AAP / EXPL BASE I L E P  1 &11 1 EXPL BASE I ORBIT ASSY 
TIIIM 
Long t rans i t  
t imes  require 
all-up 
delivery 
Trans i t  
to & f rom 
surface 
Transi t  TEM / 
Modules 
by wnxnanned vehicles. The orbital workshop is delivered by a S a b r n  IB, and the 
Apoldo Telescope Mount (AT%%%) Is delivered by a combination of the S a h r n  IB and the 
lunar  module (LM) ascent stage, The logistics and support function is provided by a 
manned eornmand and service mo&&e (CSM) on a $abraa IB, The large earth orbital 
exploration base will make use of a similar transportation scheme with the base e%e- 
ments being delivered by unmanned S a h r n  V launches, but the logistics and suppoa-t 
furlction could be accomplished by both manned and unmanned vehicles. 
Conceptually, it is suggested that a permanent lunar exploration base will utilize 
the same pattern of unmanned primary element delivery with logistics and support 
functions being provided by both manned and unmanned systems. The early LEP does 
not follow this pattern, however. In this program we a r e  attempting to deliver both 
the primary exploration elements and the personnel with single manned launches. As 
a result, we have a limited lunar exploration potential, of the order  of several days 
with payloads of the order of 1, 000 pounds. A limited increase in this exploration 
potential could be achieved by use of dual manned launches to a single site or  with a 
Titan 111 launched unmanned lander. Both approaches have received some considera- 
tion. As pointed out earlier,  the Lunar Flyer and Lunar Rover have been under study 
as manned support vehicles for  the surface exploration. 
We now come to the somewhat more nebulous planetary exploration base consid- 
eration. Studies to date have shown that we must first deliver multiple Saturn V pay- 
loads (3 to 12) to earth orbit and assemble them to get the required payload for any 
type of manned planetary exploration. Again, the same pattern of unmanned launches 
for the principal elements into earth orbit would appear a logics choice. However, 
we really have two transportation requirements in this case. The second one is the 
delivery of the exploration base from earth orbit to the planet, At this point, i t  would 
appear that due to the large transit  t imes required, we should deviate from the previ- 
ously established pattern and send our personnel along to husband and maintain the 
base enroute. This is a point that undoubtably will be considered carefully, though, 
before the actual rational to be used is eventually evolved. 
It is possible to consider the earth orbital exploration base's transportation ve- 
hicle requirements a bit further. Table 11 presents the principal mission requirements 
for  these vehicles. 
TABLE 11 
LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT VEHICLE REQWREMENTS 
FOR EARTH ORBITAL EXPLORATION BASE 
Resupply - 90 to 180 day launch centers (initial capability) 
As required (ultimate capability) 
Rendezvous, Reentry, & Landing - Manned and unmanned 
Land Landing - Pr imary ,  with emergency water landing capability 
Node &at these requirements are principally the flight-path control type, The 
land landing rewireanent for manned vehicles will present a demanding izavig;L&ioa~, 
g7-1idance7 and control consistency, fo r  once the retrograde imy~ulse is fired, the ve- 
hicle will generally be committed to some type of land landing, Current concepts for 
aeconiplishirag these landings involve the use of unpowered, low subsonic L/D vehicles 
with a possibility of a limited powered go-around capability for more advanced ever- 
sions. In either case, the vehicle must reach a specific site. The accuracy required 
at the end of reentry is not too demanding, however, being of the order  I. 5 nautical 
miles one sigma to allow a successful terminal glide phase to the landing site with 
glide L /D z 2.3. 4 
The unmanned cargo delivery, a s  pointed out earlier,  is an interesting require- ,  
ment. Studies of an unmanned launch, rendezvous, and docking of the LM/ATM to the 
AAP workshop, a s  well as the Russian space program experience, have shown that 
this is a .feasible technique. The LM primary guidance, navigation and control system 
with the rendezvous radar input has the requisite performance to deliver the LM/ATM 
to a station-keeping position approximately 1,000 feet from the orbital assembly. The 
LM Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is alined prior to launch and no further alinement 
is necessary throughout the three- to four-revolution rendezvous profile. Simulations 
of a manually controlled visual docking using a remote command link to the LM/ATM 
from the orbital assembly to bring it in  from its station-keeping position have shown 
this to be a feasible technique using no instrumentation other than the out-the-window 
view. This technique, of course, is in contrast to the completely automatic docking 
method used in the Russian program. 5 
Exploration Bases 
For the purposes of this paper, only the mission-objective requirements of the 
earth exploration base will be discussed. Table 111 presents the general mission pro- 
file requirements for the earth orbital base. 
TABLE 111 
EARTH ORBITAL EXPLORATION BASE MISSION PROFILE 
Altitude - 200 n. mi. to 300 n. mi. circular 
Inclination - 50" to 90" 
Duration - Two years  minimum 
The high inclination orbits will limit the amount of ground tracking available, 
assuming the present Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) complex. The extended 
duration lifetime, even a t  the orbital altitudes contemplated, will undoubtably require 
a periodic orbit adjustment to counteract the orbit decay due to atmospheric effects, 
It will obviously also result in some rather demanding reliability r eq i sements  on the 
space station equipment. Notice in f i p r e  2 that the average manned mission flight time 
EARTH ORBIT 
EXPL BASE 
n 
8 
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Figure 2. Average Earth-Orbital Program Flight Hours P e r  Manned Flight 
increases  approximately an order  of magnitude between each of these ear th orbital  
programs. Apollo's average manned mission time, as shown, is of the order  of 
Gemini's. The impact f rom these increasing mission t imes  on the system mechani- 
zation i s  an important factor and will be discussed la ter .  
Mission Objective Requirements 
The ear th orbital exploration base mission-objective requirements a r e  encom- 
passed by the nine experimental program areas ,  Table IV, identified and documentecr 
by the NASA Space Station Requirements Steering Committee, and developed and 
documented fur ther  i n  the Experiment Program for  Manned Orbital Workshops pre-  
pared by the NASA Manned Space Flight Extension Working Group. 7 
The particular experiments, some of the experimental techniques, the instru- 
mentation to be used in accomplishing them, and the resulting orbital base require- 
ments have been studied and documented in several  in-house and contracted studies. 
It i s  not within the scope of this paper to present a consolidated and detailed listing of 
these requirements nor to discuss the question of whether all of these requirements 
TARLE IV 
EXPERYMENTAL PROGRAM AREAS 
Astronomy/Astrophysies 
Earth Resources 
Atmospheric Sciences 
Physical Science 
Advanced Technology and Subsystems 
Manned Space Operations and Logistics 
Communication/~avigation/~raffic Control 
~ iomedica l /~ehav io ra l  
Bioscience 
should be met on a manned space base. They have been reviewed, however, in an 
attempt to establish bounds. The orbital base mission-objective requirements a r e  
most closely related to the navigation and the control functions, with the guidance func- 
tion being of secondary importance. 
Pointing Control Requirements: Considerable attention has been directed at the point- 
ing control requirements, and figure 3, prepared from data in contractor report 
NASA-CR-92299 entitled "Combined Mission Requirements. Saturn V Single Launch 
SIX MlSSlON 
OBJ AREAS 
1 
-------------- lo I 
POINTING 
ACCURACY, 
BEG 
NUMBER OF EXP IMST'S 
Figure 3,  E a r ~ l - O r b i t  Exploration Base Cumrrlat%ve Po.~radir~g Aectrracy 
Ilistribution, Six Mission-Objective Areas 
Space Station and Observation Facility, >bows the cumu%aBive disk;ribuL%oas. of pointing 
accuracy requirements f a r  six experimental a reas ,  Since we do not expect lo be abbe 
to control the space shtian itself to an accuracy of less I h a ~  one-tentha to one-half of a 
degree, about halk: of the experimental instruments will have to independendby provide 
the pointing accuracy &ey require, Also, this value of space station ~ G C U F ~ G J P  i s  with 
respect to the at t ihde sensor mounting pads, 13eeause of %herma1 distortions and 
other effects, it is not likely that this accuracy will be available at any given space 
8 
station position. For example, studies of a horizon scanner installation a t  the base 
of the CSM showed that the vehicle had a distortion of about 0.35 degree from one end 
to the other when the cylindrical axis of the spacecraft was normal to the sunline with 
no roll  rate. This vehicle distortion resulted in a sensor misalignment with respect 
to the navigation base of twice this angle. These requirements represent different 
reference f rames  (e. g, , local vertical stellar-inertial). Because of the different 
reference frames, a zero-g orbital base will have segments which must be attitude 
controlled in the presence of three different rates, and an artificial g orbital base will 
have an additional one. These ra tes  a r e  a s  follows: (a) inertial, (b) orbital rate, 
(c) orbital regression rate, (d) spin rate, The requirement to simultaneously satisfy 
many different pointing requirements has been a challenge in the past and shows prom- 
i se  of being a sizeable task for the space base in the future. 
Navigation Requirements: In all considerations of experiments, there has  been little 
attention directed a t  the question of what the required navigational accuracy was, o r  
if ,  in fact, any navigation requirements existed at all. Apparently, it is assumed that 
since the space station is in a relatively fixed orbit, we will always know where it is. 
This is essentially true. However, the primary questions to be asked a r e  how well do 
we have to know where it is, who has to know, and when do they have to know? Only 
by answering these questions will we be able to determine how we shall provide this 
knowledge. Thus, the available information on the contemplated experiments has been 
reviewed in an attempt to determine the explicit and implied navigation requirements. 
Table V shows some of these results. 
Although much of this information is descriptive rather than quantitative, it 
nevertheless indicates a need for  navigation information in real time, on board the 
orbital base for  experiment support. The positions of the various celestial bodies of 
concern (e. g., earth, sun, moon), and the time that particular earth sun lighting con- 
ditions occur cannot be determined without knowing what the orbital base's position is 
with respect to the chosen reference frame. The appearance of unwanted celestial 
bodies in the field of view of an instrument during the exposure of a film plate must 
be avoided by maintaining a reasonable amount of ephemeridics information on board. 
Tracking ground targets automatically from the space station also requires an accurate 
knowledge of the spacecraft's position. There a r e  two quantiktive requirements which 
will be very difficult to achieve. The first is the requirement to know relative position 
to 5 to 10 meters  over ranges of 1000 to 2000 nautical miles. It results from the need 
to limit cartographic er,ror propagation when tieing large numbers of sequential photo- 
graphic f rames  together. The other requirement, position knowledge to 100 meters, 
resul ts  from a stellar refraction experiment used to obtain atmospheric density data, 
In view of the fact that "Le position of the M S ; m  stations themselves is generally not 
known to better Wlan 7'5 to 150 meters in longitude, meeting &ese requirements will be 
a challenge, 
TABLE V 
EARTH ORBITAL BASE 
mSSIOW-BBJEC TIVE NAVIGATION REQUIREMENTS 
Ast ronomy/~s t rophys ies  
Dark side of orbit 
>go0 f rom sun 
Sun s ide of orbit 
Avoid ear th  occultation 
Physical Sciences 
Deploy and retr ieve 
subsatelli tes 
Sun orientation 
Earth Resources 
- 
Near local noon 
Daytime 
Sun angle 30" above horizon 
Track 2 to I 0  targets  per  orbit  
Know relative position to 5 to  
10  meters  over ranges of 
1000 to 2000 nautical miles  
Atmospheric Sciences 
Avoid sightings just p r ior  to  dawn 
Sun angle > 10" 
Know position to 100 me te r s  
Navigate to < 2.0  n. mi. 
~ornm/Nav/Traff ic  Control Manned Space Operations & Logistics 
Track synchronous Data capsule returned to selected 
altitude satell i te s i te  
Point narrow beam 
antennas 
Point l a s e r s  
GUIDANCE, N A V I G A T I O N  AND CONTROL MECHANIZATION CONS I DERATIONS FOR 
EARTH O R B I T A L  SYSTEMS 
In the foregoing limited discussion of requirements for  the advanced programs 
under consideration, there a r e  several  quantitative guidance, navigation and control 
requirements that may be difficult to  meet. To a large extent, however, we have 
demonstrated much of the GN&C performance these programs require  s o  the principal 
mechanization challenge for  the future will not be in meeting discrete  performance re -  
quirements. I t  is going to result  f rom the need to achieve extremely difficult reliabil- 
ity goals. The interesting thing about these reliability goals for  the future is that they 
will, more than ever before, be intimately associated with program costs. This is a 
resul t  of the extended duration operational characteristic of the exploration bases. As  
the number of transportation flights becomes large, the possibility of incurring a failure 
in the guidance, navigation and control system increases.  If the mission must be 
aborted due to such a failure, the cost  of that failure can be  quite substantial. Thus, 
it is necessary to make the transportation system guidance and control system reliable 
enough to keep the frequency of such failures very low. In addition, for  very long 
space base operational t imes, the replacement rate  for  the on-board guidance, navi- 
gation and control equipment is defined by the equipment failure sate ,  Thus, to mini- 
mize the cost of keeping the system operational, i t  must be kept as simple and as 
reliable a s  possible, Coupling these factors  with the need to minimize the guidance, 
navigation and control overall recrarring costs by not over specifying sequlre%zaesn";s 
and by reusing equipment that has flown, then gives us  an indication of the nature of 
our future mechanization ekralXenge, 
Transgscdrtatis~s Systems 
In discussing the GN&C mechanization considerations for transportation systems, 
it is informative to first consider the approach used and the experience gained in our 
f i r s t  three manned space transportation systems --- Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. 
Efforts were made in the guidance and control developments for each of these pro- 
grams to avoid single point failures which could have catastrophic consequences. Due 
to limitations in the available state of the art ,  however, coupled with severe payload 
restrictions, it was not possible to place equal emphasis on minimizing the probability 
of crew loss and on maximizing mission success. Thus, for  all three programs the 
requirements for  crew safety were higher than the requirements placed on mission 
success. Because of the environmental unknowns inherent in each program and the 
fact that each one was largely developmental in nature, this ordering of reliability re-  
quirements was both desirable and necessary. In fact, since the principal purpose of 
these transportation systems was crew delivery to station and return, it could even be 
argued that the mission success was not severely compromised. The general approach 
used was to have a high-performance simplex primary system backed up by several de- 
graded performance backup or  abort modes. The mission guidance and control reli- 
ability was largely defined by the primary system and the crew safety by the reliability 
of the parallel backup modes. Conceptually, the rational for this type of mechanization 
was that the degraded performance backup systems, being simpler, would have a higher 
reliability and thus be l e s s  likely to fail than would the primary system. In addition, 
the possibility of a catastrophic failure of the total guidance and control system would 
be minimized because of the use of generically different hardware in the mechaniza- 
tions. In practice, this mechanizational approach, coupled with a careful and meticu- 
lous flight hardware qualification and verification prior to flight, has worked extremely 
well as attested by the remarkable string of successes achieved in these programs to 
date. 
As the missions became more complex, however, some undesirable constraints 
associated with this approach began to evidence themselves, particularly on Apollo. 
One result of this type of mechanization was that the lower performance systems 
tended to require more fuel to accomplish given functions than did the higher perform- 
ance guidance and control systems. The command module's computer-mechanized 
digital autopilot, for  example, which can refrain from firing reaction control system 
jets in opposition, requires approximately 20 percent l e s s  fuel, a t  a typical command 
and service module center of gravity offset, than does its analogue control system 
which does not have this logical capability. Another problem results in trying to use 
a l e s s  accurate backup system to monitor a primary system. It is sometimes nec- 
essary  to limit the capability of the primary system so that the lower performance 
backup system can be used to monitor it. F ' Q ~  example, it is necessary to prohibit 
the primary guidance and navigation system from flying some satisfactory reentry dra- 
jectories because Lhe Entry Monitor System (EMS) cannot discriminate beheen  these 
s a ~ s f a c t o r y  trajectories and Wlose that result with a particular type of p idance  and 
navigation system failure, An a d d i ~ o n a l  problem associated with the EMS when it is 
used to guide the reentry is that the touchdown range dispersion is greatly increased 
over that  aehieva?lale with the pr imary system, although crew s d e t y  i s  not cornpro- 
rnised, A final problena associated with this type of mechanizatiorr philosophy also in- 
vslsres the C ~ P V  interface with the GN&C systems, On bo& Gemini and Apollo, rfiueh 
time, effort, and training h a s  gone into developing techniques, procedures, rational 
and logic k'or monitoring, failure de%ec"c;ing, and switching from the simplex primary 
G&N system to &he various &ort or  backup options. In each time-critical G&C opera- 
tion such a s  rendezvous, LM descent, and entry, the procedure development and 
training problem has been compounded by the multiple backup modes and the need to 
integrate the ground tracking and command capability with the various degraded on- 
board options. At time-critical points in the mission profiles, time-lines have been 
stretched out and functions to be accomplished have been compartmentalized to allow 
the monitoring function to be accomplished. This compounded crew interface problem 
has  largely, although admittedly not entirely, been decreed by this type of system 
mechanization. Even after carefully and systematically developing these procedures 
and interfaces, we a r e  still continually faced with a remote possibility of failure of the 
simplex primary system in the middle of a time-critical operation and a r e  strongly 
dependent on the crew's ability to respond properly under stressful conditions for  
crew safety and success of the mission. 
In view of the foregoing constraints and limitations, a great  deal of study should 
be  directed towards the design of guidance, navigation and control systems utilizing 
true redundancy techniques for  future transportation systems. These studies should 
have a s  a goal the achievement of mission success and crew safety reliability require- 
ments which a r e  equivalent. The Apollo Saturn V launch vehicle already uses  some 
redundancy techniques in both its guidance and control systems. The launch vehicle 
computer, for example, has triple modular redundancy (TMR) which allows it to con- 
tinue functioning despite failures in discrete modules. 
To supplement the Saturn launch vehicle redundant control system experience, 
we will be looking to the aircraft industry in general and the supersonic transport 
developments in particular, since our advanced transportation system reliability ob- 
jectives will parallel those that they have been concerned with for a number of 
years. The possible use of redundant inertial navigation systems in the 
a i r  transport industry is only now beginning to evolve. Current considerations for the 
supersonic transport include both multiple gimballed inertial navigation systems and 
redundant strapdown systems. l4  l 5  In fact, the economic requirements of the super- 
sonic transport that dictate the need to complete its mission profile despite discrete 
navigation failures parallels in kind, though not necessarily in magnitude, our eco- 
nomic need to complete transporbtion missions. The redundant strapdown system, 
either in the form of two or  more triads, o r  as a single system using six gyros and 
six accelerometers arranged nonorthogonally, l6 which can sustain multiple failures 
of gyros and accelerometers and still keep functioning, shows promise of very nicely 
solving the redundant inertial sensing problem for the earth orbital logistics shuttle. 
In fact, i t  could probably be shown that one such redundant inertial measurement unit, 
mounted in the Apollo command module and properly integrated, could provide the 
functions of the G&N inertial measurement unit, the six-body mounted gyros in the 
S C S ,  and the  ST124 inertial measurement unit platform in the Salarrn launch vehicle 
with an improvement in system reliability, Since the redundant strapdown unit would 
replace I2 gyros, 7 accelerometers, and 6 gimbals, there is little doubt that the weight 
and power trade-off would be in  i t s  favor, even accounting for the additional cornpub- 
tional complexity incurred, Of course, the cost of implementing this change at this 
point in  the Apollo Prograna's development could never be amortized over the remain- 
ing Program l3etirne and so 14: would not be done, The potential of this integrated ;ap- 
proach for the fuhre ,  however, can hardly be ignored, The additional cost, both 
nonrecurring and recurring, to achieve the redundancy can be traded sf1 agains"&he 
cost of G&C failure over the transportation system's lifetime. 
As a last point concerning the mechanization aspects of transportation systems, 
the control equipment that is jettisoned with expendable launch vehicle stages must be 
minimized to reduce recurring costs. 
Orbital Base 
We have a s  yet had no experience in operating space exploration bases. The 
AAP will be the first of these, though it will be relatively small and have a somewhat 
limited lifetime. It has some interesting control system pointing requirements which 
require the principal experimental apparatus to be gimballed with respect to the space- 
craft and controlled to the instrument sight line while the spacecraft itself is controlled 
with respect to inertial space by relatively large two-degree-of-freedom control 
moment gyros. The required accuracy of control on the instrument sight line is 
+ 2.5  a r c  seconds in pitch and yaw while the spacecraft is controlled to -1 4 a r c  minutes 
about the same axes against crew disturbances and other spacecraft disturbances. 
This method of using t iers  of control systems ranging from a coarse to a fine control 
accuracy is expected to be characteristic of the control system distribution to be used 
in the orbital base. Thus, the results to be gained from the actual flight experience 
of the AAP will be of considerable interest. The program has few mission-objective 
navigation requirements, however. 
The earth orbital exploration base will in essence be an orbiting facility itself, 
and thus can be expected to have a rather sizeable computation facility on board. In 
fact, it is conceivable that, in the time period under consideration, the orbiting base 
computational capability could approach the capacity and compubtional flexibility of 
some of our present ground computer installations. In view of the expected time- 
varying nature of many of the activities on board the space base (experiments will 
come and go), it is expected that the computational facility will have to expand and 
contract a s  necessary to provide the needed computational support efficiently. The 
multiprocessor16 shows promise of providing this needed flexibility a s  well a s  on-line 
redundancy when required. The variation in capacity can be accomplished on a short- 
te rm basis by putting modules on-line o r  off-line a s  the computational demand varies. 
This would conserve power and minimize equipment operating time, Additionally, in 
the longer term, the capacity could be expanded o r  contracted by physically adding o r  
removing compuktional modules, provided the interfaces were appropriately arranged. 
It will undoubtably be highly desirable also to s k n h r d i z e  %he b p e s  of computational 
rnoctules and use them in both the space base and the I;ranspcrrbtion shuttles, This 
approach. would provide the advanbge of interchangeability for maintenance purposes 
and wo%;ld have some economic a~ad reliaM?i%y benefits which wsuld accrue from the 
larger produetion volume, 
There are some unique eomptatational requirements, however, having character- 
i s t ics  that a eent rd l ized  general purpose computatioraal facility caranot gracefully ban- 
dle. 'rbese are generaJly associated with subsystems having large bandw"Lth and 
relatively fixed format  eompudational needs and which in  addition often require complex 
input-output interfaces.  One example is the computational requirements of a complex 
general-purpose display system, which must have a variety of format  generators and 
a large repetition ra te  associated with i t s  information input. The mnultipurpose dis- 
play, incidently, is an extremely important requirement for  the space base. In the 
past  an  inordinately large penalty in  weight, volume, and power was paid for  multitudes 
of single purpose displays that were used at only singular points in  the mission profiles. 
The total weight of a l l  panels, instruments, and switches on the CSM, for  example, ap- 
proached the total weight of the G&N system. The multipurpose display is also appli- 
cable to the transportation shuttle to some degree. Because the shuttle's display 
requirements and the shuttle operator 's  experience will be very s imi la r  to those of 
aircraft ,  however, the degree of applicability requires  a careful assessment.  Other 
examples a r e  associated with sensors  having unique processing requirements, and 
control computers having complex input-output requirements and transmission pro- 
blems associated with sending a variety of signals to different types of torquers.  For  
these special requirements, it may be advisable to u se  computational modules which 
a r e  tailored to the need. Conceivably, they could be under the mas ter  control of the 
central processor  but could also maintain a degree of autonomy which would allow 
them to continue functioning in  the event of ser ious problems in the central processor.  
With the availability of a n  onboard computational facility, it should be possible 
to  use  the best  orbital navigation models available in the time period to propagate the 
base ' s  state vector. In fact, the models could be changed at any t ime i f  better ones 
became available. Therefore, the decision of which navigational system mechaniza- 
tion to u se  should not be  constrained by a need for  onboard computational efficiency. 
The problem then reduces to the sensing question. How shall the initial conditions be 
established, and what shall be the means used to periodically update the propagated 
state vector to bound the navigational e r r o r ?  In attempting to answer this question, 
we a r e  confronted with the dichotomy of the flight controller/ground tracking complex 
and the astronaut/onboard navigation system. Apollof s flight experience is in  the 
process  of providing additional knowledge fo r  those who would c a r e  to pursue the 
question f rom either point of view. The question of which to use  on the space base 
cannot be resolved in this paper, however, since the answer transcends the navigation 
question alone, and becomes involved in the overall data t ransfer  question. It  is known 
that MSFN, due to i t s  predominately low latitude distribution, provides a spotty and 
low-percentage coverage for  orbital inclinations in  the 50" to 90" range. This fact 
will not only limit the amount of ground tracking available for  updating the space base 's  
s ta te  vector, but will severely constrain the information t ransfer  capability. There a r e  
two possibilities for  removing this information t ransfer  constraint. One is the use  of 
a synchronous orbit  data relay satellite system, l7  which would allow continuous com- 
munication between the space base and a mission control ground station. The space 
base, with some additional pointing control complexity invested in tracking communi- 
cations antennas to allow a high bandwidth information rate  (e. g., O,I to 4 megabits 
per  second), could also generate i t s  needed navigational updates by tracking the 
synchronous satellites, although the accuracy achievable by this method has sti l l  to be 
defiried, The other possibility i s  to reiilove the need for  the high idormat ion  rate  
transfer by doing most of the required data processing with the onhoasd computational. 
facility. The required navigational. napdates would then be generated with a suitable 
eomk~inaMora of stellar and earth sensors,  
Assuming the required navigation sensing m e h o d  to be used is based on a com- 
bin;Llion of earth senso r s  m&ing measurements in an -iner"cial reference frame, some 
ear ly  r e s d t s  f rom our  flight experience should be considered, Tracking landmarks 
mmually is a n  undesirable chore. Once the astronaut has  demonstrated &a"che can 
update his  state vector as well o r  almost as well as MSFN can, he isn't interested in 
doing i t  repetitively except i n  ca ses  where he is highly motivated ---- such as making 
s u r e  personally that he is really going to hit the reentry corr idor  -- o r  that his  lunar 
orbit  insertion point is a respectable altitude above the surface. Keeping t rack of 
where the space base is by tracking three o r  more landmarks per  orbit, every orbit, 
will not generate a des i r e  in  many astronauts to earn  space navigators wings. In 
addition, orbital manhours will be expensive in the orbital  base and should be used in 
more  beneficial tasks,  Thus, though we can expect the crew to provide the acquisition 
function and to  periodically monitor the navigation system, it should be basically auto- 
matic in i t s  operation. 
At this point it is necessary to touch on the need fo r  simplicity. The cost of the 
navigation, guidance and control system maintenance activity, including the spare  
parts ,  will be defined by the equipment failure ra te  and the logistic system delivery 
costs. Even the ultimate figure of 5 dollars per  pound into orbit, which is often stated 
as a goal, subshntially exceeds the airfreight ra te  fo r  shipments going 250 miles. It 
is imperative that the system mean-time-to-failure be extremely long. Furthermore, 
at any point in  the lifetime of the space base, it should be possible to estimate whether 
the cost of installing a given new system with a lower failure ra te  can be amortized 
over a given number of years.  If the savings to be expected a r e  still substantial after 
accounting for  the usual uncertainties in cost  estimates,  then it would be expected that 
the change would be made. F o r  this approach to be feasible, however, it is evident 
that the space station interfaces such as power, cooling, etc. ,  must be given more  
than the usual considerations. 
CONCLUB I NG REMARKS 
There is little doubt that the manned space flight program, after overcoming 
several  developmental challenges, has  reached, o r  is about to reach, a plateau of 
operational usefulness. The guidance and control systems developed for  these previ- 
ous programs have already demonstrated much of the performance that is going to be 
required on this operational plateau. In the far d i sknee  a r e  some additional manned 
guidance and control challenges which show promise of being very interesting. How- 
ever,  before we can address  ourselves to them, we must f i r s t  develop the ability to 
provide the performance and capabilities required in the immediate future in an 
economically tenable manner. If we can achieve this near- term future goal, we will 
in  effect have solved many of the problems facing u s  in the fa r  future. The most diffi- 
cult challenge of the far future is the manned p lanekry  exploration base, for  i t  com- 
bines the t ime-crit ical widaunee and control reliability s ewi remen t s  of our earth-moon 
system transporda"con vehicles and the long-duration reliability requirements of the 
ear th orbit& exploration base in one self -contained package, By solving these problems 
in the earth o rb i td  exploration base, we shatald be able to c.odigure our planetary ex- 
plosatiola base g~ridance and eontral systems an such a way that t ime-crit ical flight 
aperztl.,cns can be ec.r?dccted 7.vil-h the n e e e s a r y  system redundancy and so thak opera- 
tional readiness can be assured with maintenance in non- t ime-cs i~ca i  flight phases, 
With enough operational experience in  the earth orbital exploration base, we should 
be able to predict quite aceura,tely the types and l~unabers of spa re s  (either wired in or  
replaceable) required s o  that when our  planetary exploration expedition retxrns and i s  
faced with that last time-critical guidance and control phase, we will have sent along 
enough spa re s  so that the reentry can be accomplished with all-components-up 
redundancy . 
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